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Abstract—Similar to ﬂight data recorder (”blackbox”), motor
vehicle event data recorder (MVEDR) is a device installed
on a vehicle to record information related to the vehicle’s
conditions. This information is useful for accident investigation
but there are cases of loss or complete destruction of MVEDRs
after serious accidents. On the other hand, Vehicular Ad-hoc
NETwork (VANET) is an emerging infrastructure with roadside
units (RSUs) installed along the roads to communicate with the
vehicles. This triggers our idea of virtual distributed MVEDRs
using VANET. Conceptually, event data is transmitted to RSUs as
vehicles pass by. Like other VANET-based applications, security
and privacy are two major concerns of drivers. In addition,
volume/frequency of data to be transmitted to and stored at RSUs
may be an issue. In this paper, we propose a secure and privacy-
preserving scheme for vehicle-RSU communications so that event
data and driver identities can only be revealed by authorized
personnel. We show that our idea is feasible, through simulations,
in terms of transmission overhead due to extra security controls
with different data uploading intervals.
Index Terms—Event data recorder, secure vehicular sensor
network, authentication, veriﬁcation
I. INTRODUCTION
Similar to a ”blackbox” (ﬂight data recorder) in an aero-
plane, a motor vehicle event data recorder (MVEDR) is an
electronic device installed on a vehicle that records infor-
mation related to the conditions of the vehicle such as its
current speed and engine status. Its standard has been deﬁned
by the IEEE Vehicular Technology Society in 2005 [1] with
an amendment made in 2010 [2]. According to the standard,
a total of 86 items are recorded by an MVEDR. They cover a
variety of information including acceleration, velocity, air bag
status, indicator lamp status, etc. All these information are very
useful for the investigation of the cause of accidents. Although
most MVEDRs are basically resilient to conditions like strong
vibration and high temperature, cases of loss or complete
destruction after serious accidents are still very common as
they are located inside the vehicles. In addition, it may be
difﬁcult to ensure that the stored data has not been altered.
On the other hand, to improve the safety and efﬁciency of
road usage, ITS (Intelligent Transportation System [3]) was
prposed. This system relies on a new ad hoc network infras-
tructure called vehicular ad hoc network (VANET). VANET
is no longer just a research topic. Quite a few countries
(e.g. United States, Japan, and some European countries)
are considering to build the VANET infrastructure in their
countries. In the abstract model of VANET, there are three
major components: (a) each vehicle is equipped with an on-
board unit (OBU); (b) along the roads, routers called road-
side units (RSU) are installed; (c)all RSUs are connected
through a ﬁxed network (e.g. Internet) to a trusted authority
(TA) and other application servers in the control center. OBUs
and RSUs use the Dedicated Short Range Communications
(DSRC) wireless protocol [4] for communication. Through this
infrastructure, vehicles can boardcast messages (via RSUs) to
nearby vehicles for safety purpose in case the engine fails
or the driver applies brake suddently. The control center can
also broadcast messages through RSUs to vehicles informing
them the trafﬁc conditions as well as trafﬁc accidents so that
drivers can adjust their routes in a real-time manner. Based on
the information from RSUs, the control center can also adjust
the trafﬁc lights in order to minimize the trafﬁc congestion. In
recent years, VANET has been extended to provide a variety of
infotainment services. This triggers our idea of having virtual
distributed MVEDRs in VANET.
Conceptually, rather than storing only locally, MVEDR
data can be transmitted to RSUs for distributed storage as
the vehicles pass by. After an accident, a TA together with
the service provider can collect these data for investigation.
Like other VANET applications, security and privacy are the
main concerns. For example, since the MVEDR data may be
used in court as evidence for an accident. The integrity and
authenticity of the MVEDR data sent from an OBU must
be guaranteed before it is accepted. Otherwise, an attacker
can replace the real MVEDR data or even inject some fake
data in order to affect the normal operation of RSUs. For
the privacy issue, a driver may not want others (including the
RSUs which are always left unattended along roadsides) to
know his/her driving routes. This can be traced by analyzing
the MVEDR data. Thus, the challenges are how to make sure
that the MVEDR data are authenticated while the identity of
the driver can be anonymous (at least on RSUs). Note that
while the anonymity is critical, a vehicle’s real identity should
be revealable by a trusted authority when an accident takes
place. For example, the police, who is assumed to be honest,
should be able to relate which MVEDR data has been sent
by a certain vehicle when it is involved in an accident. In
this way, a driver who breaches the transportation regulations
cannot escape by means of anonymous identities.
In this paper, we use the terms ”vehicle”, ”OBU” and
”driver” interchangeably. Our scheme requires an OBU to
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upload its MVEDR data to RSUs nearby along its journey
periodically. To preserve the driver’s privacy, we use two
techniques: 1) Pseudo identities instead of real identities are
used in the uploading process. These pseudo identities are
generated and signed by the service provider before any
uploading takes place. 2) All MVEDR data are encrypted
before uploading so that no other vehicles or RSUs can know
their actual contents. To ensure integrity and to avoid attacks
targeting at RSUs, besides encrypted MVEDR data, an OBU
needs to attach a signature on the encrypted MVEDR data.
This signature can be veriﬁed by the RSU nearby while the
vehicle’s real identity does not need to be disclosed. As an
RSU may receive from a large number of vehicles at the
same time, an RSU may become a processing bottleneck.
To reduce RSUs’ veriﬁcation time, our scheme facilitates an
RSU to verify OBU pseudo identities as well as signatures
in batches. Finally, upon successful veriﬁcation of pseudo
identities and signatures, an RSU stored the current time, the
received encrypted MVEDR data together with the vehicle’s
pseudo identity into its local storage device. Previous entries
in an RSU’s storage device are ﬂushed at regular intervals (say
after a day) to allow the storage of more up-to-date MVEDR
data. When an accident takes place, the trusted party (e.g. the
police) ﬁrst ﬁnds out the set of pseudo identities being used by
the vehicles concerned. They then download the corresponding
encrypted MVEDR data from the RSUs located around the
accident scene. Next, the trusted party uses its secret key to
open the MVEDR data for investigation purpose. As such, a
vehicle’s MVEDR data can only be traced by the trusted party
after an accident.
II. RELATED WORK
The idea of distributed motor vehicle event data recorder
(MVEDR) is new as all existing MVEDRs are for local data
storage only as deﬁned in [1] and [2]. On the other hand,
the securtiy issues in VANET have been activiely investi-
gated [5–8]. For examples, to provide efﬁcient veriﬁcation
of the authenticity of messages from OBUs, [6] proposes
a batch veriﬁcation scheme that only uses very few pairing
operations for a large number of signatures. Secure inter-
vehicle and group communications are considered in [5, 7].
These protocols make use of RSUs as the middle-man for
communications. In [8], the authors further streamlined the
communications between known vehicles (i.e., the drivers
know each other). After a simple handshake with an RSU,
these vehicles can verify signatures of one another without
involving RSUs. This is useful when the number of RSUs are
sparse or the communication load of the channel is heavy.
In general, all these protocols were designed for inter-vehicle
communications and cannot be applied to solve the MVEDR
problem being considered in this paper.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Assumptions
1) The servers in the control center, such as TA are trusted.
2) Since RSUs are left unattended on the roadside and may
be hacked, we assume that they are not trusted.
3) As mentioned in the above, RSUs and TA can commu-
nicate through Internet.
4) We make use of PKI (public key infrastructure) to
generate a pair of public key CPKi and a private key CSKi
for each vehicle Vi identiﬁed by its license plate number LPi.
We also assume that through this infrastructure, the updated
master secret s can be passed to each vehicle through a secure
channel. Each vehicle is also given a TA-signed certiﬁcate
Certi containing information of CPKi and LPi. Section
IV will provide details on the generation and veriﬁcation of
Certi.
5) The real identity of any vehicle is only known by the TA,
even RSUs do not know it. Note that we make use of pseudo
identities in our protocols.
6) We assume that RSUs have local storage (or local
databases) to store pseudo identities of vehicles and encrypted
MVEDR data.
7) All cryptographic operations needed in the protocol will
be performed by OBU on each vehicle. The keys and the
pseudo identities are also stored in this device (See Section
IV for more details). Also its input and output interfaces are
limited so that only pre-deﬁned functions can be carried out.
Similar to the assumption in [9], we further assume that OBU
have its own clock for generating correct time stamps and can
work on its own battery.
8) For synchronization purpose, we require TA to broadcasd
the current time periodically to RSUs and OBUs (via RSUs)
to guarantee that they all have roughly the same time.
B. Security Requirements
We deﬁne the following security requirements:
1) MVEDR data integrity and authentication: A vehicle
should be authenticated and the updated MVEDR data must
be integrity-checked and signed by a valid vehicle before the
MVEDR data is accepted for storage.
2) Identity privacy-preserving: Except the TA, the real
identity of a vehicle must be kept anonymous from all other
vehicles and RUSs. The real identify should not be revealed
even if all messages sent by the vehicles are analyzed.
3) Traceability: TA should have the ability to reveal the
real identity of a vehicle (driver) so that a driver cannot avoid
liability if he/she is involved in an accident.
4) Conﬁdentiality: The content of any MVEDR data should
be kept conﬁdential from eavesdroppers as well as RSUs. That
is, even if an adversary compromises some or even all RSUs,
he/she cannot get any MVEDR data.
We remark that there are other types of attacks for typical
networks such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) and
privacy breach due to beacon signals [10] that can also be
applied to a VANET environment. Since there are existing
techniques, such as [11] and [12] respectively, that tackle these
attacks, we do not consider these attacks in this paper. But
we would like to emphasize that these attacks should not be
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overlooked and are worth further investigations in the VANET
infrastructure.
IV. OUR SOLUTIONS
This section presents our scheme in details. Our scheme
contains ﬁve modules and relies on a cryptographic operation,
called pairing and this operation is deﬁned on two cyclic
groups with a mapping called bilinear map [13].
A. System Setup
During system startup, TA carries out the following:
1) TA chooses G, GT that satisfy bilinear map properties.
2) Let P be the generator of G. TA randomly picks s ∈
Zq as the system master secret and computes Ppub = sP as a
public parameter. TA can update s and the corresponding Ppub
at any time. The most up-to-date s can then be securely sent
to each vehicle Vi using its conventional public key CPKi
(to be discussed in the third point below) while the most up-
to-date Ppub can be made public. There is no need to perform
these updates frequently or regularly. It is only required when
a vehicle unregisters (i.e. a vehicle is no longer eligible to
know the value of s) or when any vehicle is proved to have
been compromised (i.e. the value of s is already disclosed to
attackers). Since s is encrypted using each vehicle’s public
key, RSUs cannot know its value. We remark that although
this approach still leaves a time window for the compromised
vehicles to inject fake data into the system and the key
distribution process may induce some overhead, we argue that
it is already better than the approach used in [6] in which the
system master secret cannot be updated.
3) TA assigns itself an identity TRID and sets its secret
key TSK such that TRID = TSK × P . TRID is known
by everyone in the system. TA also generates a pair of
conventional public and private keys, TCPK and TCSK ,
respectively, for itself under the principle of any asymmetric
encryption standard such as RSA.
4) During the ﬁrst registration (with physical inspection) of
each vehicle Vi, TA assigns each vehicle Vi a real identity
V RIDi and an OBU activation password V PWDi. V RIDi
is deﬁned as xP where x is a random number. Note that
TA does not need to keep the value of x after generating
V RIDi. Next, TA generates a pair of conventional public
and private keys, CPKi and CSKi respectively, for Vi
under the principle of any asymmetric encryption standard
such as RSA. Then, TA signs Vi’s certiﬁcate as V Ci =
< V RIDi, CPKi, TSIGTSK(V RIDi||CPKi) > where
TSIGTSK(V RIDi||CPKi) = TSK ×H(V RIDi||CPKi)
and H(.) is a MapToPoint hash function [14]. Vehicle Vi can
use V Ci for initial authentication to obtain the most up-to-date
master key s and a pool of pseudo identities when it starts up.
Finally, TA preloads V RIDi, V PWDi, CSKi and V Ci into
the OBU of Vi. The OBU is assumed to be tamper-proof in the
sense that it is not easy to obtain these values. Also the OBU
does not provide any interface for directly reading these values,
which can only be used for internal cryptographic operations.
Throughout the paper, conventional asymmetric and sym-
metric encryptions and signatures are used occasionally (es-
pecially before a vehicle obtains the system master secret).
To be concise, let us use the notations AS ENCx(M) and
S ENCx(M), SIGx(M) to denote asymmetrically encrypt-
ing, symmetrically encrypting and signing message M using
the key x based on any asymmetric encryption, symmetric
encryption and signature algorithms, respectively. Note that for
computational efﬁciency, an asymmetric encryption function is
usually a hybrid function (i.e. using asymmetric encryption to
encrypt a session key and then using symmetric encryption
with the session key to encrypt the message). However,
for simplicity, we ignore details of such a hybrid function
and will simply denote it using AS ENCx(M). For point
multiplication such as xP , we will sometimes include the
multiplication sign × in between two points for clarity.
B. Vehicle Starting Up
When the vehicle Vi starts (say in the morning), the driver
enters the real identity V RIDi and password V PWDi (as-
signed by TA in Section IV-A) into the OBU to activate
it. If either the real identity or the password, or both are
incorrect, the OBU refuses to perform further operations. If
both the real identity and the password are correct, the OBU
generates, signs and sends a master key and pseudo iden-
tity request message Mi = {TRID, T, V Ci,MKPID Req,
SIGCSKi(T ||V Ci|| MKPID Req)} to TA via an RSU
nearby. Here T represents the current timestamp and can help
to reduce the impact of replay attacks.
Upon receiving from Vi, TA checks whether the timestamp
T included is outdated (e.g. the difference between T and
the current time is longer than a pre-deﬁned interval). If
yes, it simply drops the message. Otherwise, it veriﬁes the
certiﬁcate V Ci by checking the validity of its own signature
TSIGTSK(V RIDi||CPKi) = TSK ×H(V RIDi||CPKi)
in it. Such a checking involves the checking of whether
the equality eˆ(TSIGTSK(V RIDi||CPKi), P ) =
eˆ(H(V RIDi||CPKi), TRID) holds. TA then continues to
verify Vi’s signature SIGCSKi(T ||V Ci||MKPID Req)}
using its conventional public key CPKi.
If TA receives more than one master key and pseudo identity
request at about the same time, it can verify the certiﬁcates in
a batch using only two pairing operations as in [8].
Without loss of generality, assume that Vi’s certiﬁcate V Ci
is valid, TA continues to generate pseudo identities for Vi.
TA generates a pool of size D of pseudo identities for Vi and
D is a system parameter. For each pseudo identity V PIDij ,
TA picks a random number rij and computes V PIDij =<
V PIDij1, V PIDij2 >=< rijP, TSIGTSK(rijP ) >
where TSIGTSK(rijP ) = H(rijP ) × TSK represents
TA’s signature on rijP . To ensure that no two pseudo
identities are identical, TA maintains a sorted list to store
all random numbers generated so far. Finally, TA sends
X = {CPKi, AS ENCCPKi(T, s, V PIDi0, V PIDi1, ...,
V PIDiD, TSIGTSK(T ||s||V PIDi0||V PIDi1||
...||V PIDiD))} back to Vi via its nearby RSU. TA
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also stores Vi’s certiﬁcate V Ci and its pool of pseudo
identities into its local database for use in the MVEDR Data
Revealing module (see Section IV-E).
Vi ﬁnds that the message X is for it based
on CPKi included. Vi ﬁrst decrypts X using its
conventional private key CSKi. It then checks whether
the timestamp T included is outdated. If yes, it simply
drops the message. Otherwise, it veriﬁes TA’s signature
TSIGTSK(T ||s||V PIDi0|| V PIDi1||...||V PIDiD) by
checking whether the equality eˆ(TSIGTSK(T ||s||V PIDi0||
V PIDi1|| ...||V PIDiD), P ) =
eˆ(H(T ||s||V PIDi0||V PIDi1||...||V PIDiD), TRID)
holds. If the veriﬁcation is successful, Vi’s OBU stores all
pseudo identities V PIDi0, V PIDi1, ..., V PIDiD locally
for use in the MVEDR Uploading module (see Section IV-C).
Note that to enhance the security, Vi can use two different
key pairs for encryption / decryption and digital signature
purposes. We use only one key pair (CPKi, CSKi) in this
paper to simplify the description.
C. MVEDR Data Uploading
Our scheme requires each vehicle Vi to upload its MVEDR
data every U seconds. When Vi wants to upload MVEDR data
Mi, it performs the following steps:
1) Vi randomly generates a session key K and encrypts Mi
symmetrically as S ENCK(Mi) where S ENCK(.) can be
any symmetric encryption function.
2) Vi encrypts K using TA’s identity TRID. Vi ﬁrst
generates a random number x and then computes Ei =<
xP,K + xTRID, S ENCK(Mi) >. That is, each encrypted
data contains three parts. The ﬁrst two parts correspond to the
encrypted session key K while the last part corresponds to the
encrypted message.
3) Vi signs Ei. To sign Ei, Vi randomly picks a pseudo
identity (say V PIDij) from the pool in its local storage.
Most likely, a different pseudo identity will be used for a
different message. Even if Vi uses the same pseudo identity
for more than one uploading instance, the chance that an
attacker can trace Vi travelling route is very low since the
pseudo identities should be evenly distributed across the city
theoretically. Of course, an ideal case is that Vi obtains a
large enough pool which allows Vi to use each pseudo identity
only once throughout the journey. However, additional local
storage space will be required. Recall that the pseudo identity
V PIDij is of the format < V PIDij1, V PIDij2 >=<
rijP, TSIGTSK(rijP ) >. Vi computes the signing key as
V SKi = (V SKi1, V SKi2) where V SKi1 = sV PIDij1 and
V SKi2 = sH(V PIDij2). Finally, Vi computes the signature
σi on the current timestamp T and the encrypted MVEDR
data Ei as σi = V SKi1 + h(T ||Ei)V SKi2 where h(.) is a
one-way hash function such as SHA-1 [15].
4) Vi sends < AS ENCCPKR(V PIDij), T, Ei, σi > to
an RSU nearby. Here CPKR represents the RSU’s public
key which can be transmitted to Vi via a handshake when it
passes by the RSU. Alternatively, we can simply assume that
the vehicles have a list of valid public keys for all RSUs and
this list can be updated periodically via the startup procedure.
D. MVEDR Data Veriﬁcation and Storage
This module allows an RSU to verify the MVEDR
data uploaded by one or more vehicles based on the bi-
linear property of the bilinear map. Upon receiving <
AS ENCCPKR(V PIDij), T, Ei, σi > from Vi, the RSU
ﬁrst decrypts AS ENCCPKR(V PIDij) using its private
key CSKR. It then checks whether the timestamp T in-
cluded is outdated. If yes, it simply drops the message.
Otherwise, it veriﬁes the validity of the pseudo identity
V PIDij . Recall that the pseudo identity V PIDij is of the
format < rijP, TSIGTSK(rijP ) >. Thus the veriﬁcation
is basically a checking of TA’s signature TSIGTSK(rijP
on rijP . This in turn involves the checking of whether
eˆ(TSIGTSK(rijP ), P ) = eˆ(H(rijP ), TRID).
Next the RSU veriﬁes the validity of Vi’s signature σi on
the current timestamp T and the encrypted MVEDR data Ei.
This involves the checking of whether the equality eˆ(σi, P ) =
eˆ(V PIDij1+h(T ||Ei)H(V PIDij2), Ppub) holds. If the RSU
receives more than one MVEDR data uploading instances at
about the same time, it can verify the pseudo identities and
the signatures in batches as in [8].
The RSU stores all valid pseudo identities together with
the encrypted MVEDR data into its local database. Also it
attaches the timestamp T to the entry. That is, each entry is
of the form < T, V PIDij , Ei >.
Periodically (say every hour), the RSU transmits all valid
pseudo identities together with its identity to TA via a secure
channel. To save the transmission bandwidth, the RSU can use
a bloom ﬁlter to hold all pseudo identities as in [8].
E. MVEDR Data Revealing
When an accident takes place involving vehicle Vi, TA
performs the following steps.
1) TA ﬁnds out the set of pseudo identities being used by
Vi by looking up its database.
2) TA then checks the pseudo identities transmitted by
RSUs located around the accident scene to see which of them
possesses any pseudo identity in the set.
3) After that, TA polls the corresponding RSUs by providing
the pseudo identity concerned. If an RSU really possesses that
pseudo identity, it sends TA the corresponding timestamp and
encrypted MVEDR data as a reply.
4) Having the encrypted MVEDR data, TA performs the
decryption. Recall that an encrypted MVEDR data is of the
format Ei =< xP,K + xTRID, S ENCK(Mi) >. To
decrypt, TA multiplies xP by its private key TSK (i.e. to
obtain x × TSK × P ) and subtracts the result from the
second part to obtain K = K + xTRID− x× TSK × P =
K + xTRID − xTRID. It then uses the key K to decrypt
S ENCK(Mi).
5) TA can then start the investigation.
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V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We analyse our scheme with respect to the security require-
ments listed in Section III.
1) MVEDR data integrity and authentication: For all up-
loaded MVEDR data, the signing key V SKi1 for producing
the signature σi on encrypted MVEDR data Ei by vehicle
Vi is composed of V SKi1 and V SKi2. V SKi1 is deﬁned as
sV PIDij1 while V SKi2 is deﬁned as sH(V PIDij2) where
s is the system master secret. Due to the difﬁculty of solving
the discrete logarithm problem, there is no way for outside
attackers (not valid vehicles) to reveal s from Ppub = sP .
Thus σi guarantees that Ei is sent by a valid vehicle. Note
also that RSUs do not know the master secret s, and thus
cannot forge a message. On the other hand, an OBU can only
perform a pre-deﬁned set of functions. An inside attacker has
no way to input another vehicle’s pseudo identity and ask it
to compute the corresponding signing key and signature. Thus
inside attacks are also prevented.
2) Identity privacy-preserving: The pseudo identity
of any vehicle Vi is deﬁned as V PIDij =<
V PIDij1, V PIDij2 >=< rij ×P, TSIGTSK(rij which has
no relationship with Vi’s real identity V RIDi. The mapping
between Vi’s pseudo identities and its real identity V RIDi is
only known by TA. In other words, TA is the only party who
can trace one’s real identity from its pseudo identity. Thus
no one else can trace the location of a particular vehicle over
time and the driver’s privacy is preserved.
3) Traceability: Section IV-E shows that TA is able to trace
a vehicle’s real identity for investigation of accidents, thus
traceability is satisﬁed.
4) Conﬁdentiality: Any MVEDR data is encrypted sym-
metrically using a randomly generated session key K . This
session key K is then encrypted using TA’s identity TRID
before uploading. In this system, only TA can use its private
key TSK to obtain K and then the MVEDR data. Thus all
MVEDR data is kept conﬁdential from eavesdroppers as well
as from RSUs. Even if an adversary compromises some or
even all RSUs, he/she cannot get any MVEDR data.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our scheme
through simulations using the NS-2 network simulator [16],
which is widely adopted by the research community. In
particular, we show that the our security measures only cause
minimal performance degradation in terms of packet dropping
rate and network transmission delay.
A. Simulation Models
For some of the settings and parameters of our simulation,
we follow [5, 6]. We consider a portion of a highway and
we assume that an RSU is installed on it and the speed of
vehicles varies from 60 km/h to 80 km/h. The RSU-Vehicle
Communications (RVC) and the Inter-Vehicle Communica-
tions (IVC) ranges are set to 600 m and 300 m respectively.
In other words, the messages sent by a vehicle should be
received by the RSU when the vehicle is within 300 m IVC
range of the RSU. DSRC and IEEE 802.11a are used to
simulate the wireless communications protocol and medium
access control protocol, respectively. Drop-tail mechanism is
used for all network queues. TCP is used for the transport layer
protocol. Also we assume that all OBU and RSU antennas
are omni-directional. The bandwidth of the unicast channel is
10 Mb/s. The RSU performs batch veriﬁcation every minute
(before storage). To capture the processing time, we follow the
information in [17]. We assume that that each pairing operation
takes 4.5 ms. Each point multiplication over an elliptic curve
takes 0.6 ms. Each conventional asymmetric encryption takes
1.2 ms. Each conventional symmetric encryption takes only
0.6 ms. All these experimental results were conducted on an
Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHz computer.
We run the simulation for 3 minutes. To simulate different
trafﬁc densities, we vary the number of vehicles that have
entered the RSU’s range. We also vary the MVEDR data
uploading interval (UI) to investigate its impact on the per-
formance of our scheme. Besides, we also study the overhead
of our scheme with and without security measures (SM ).
For transmission delay, the performance of all transmission
instances are averaged to obtain a point in the graph. The
size of each pre-crash MVEDR data block is calculated to
be 18,560 bytes according to [1]. With security measures, an
overhead of 465 bytes is added to each MVEDR data block.
For each ﬁgure, each data point on the curve represents the
average performance of 5 randomly generated scenarios.
B. Simulation Results
In the ﬁrst set of experiments, we study the MVEDR
data uploading failure rate which is deﬁned as (number of
MVEDR packets that cannot be received at RSU / number
of MVEDR packets sent by vehicles) × 100%. Note that a
vehicle is moving at high speed. It may still send out MVEDR
packets when the RSU is already out of its transmission range.
However, these packets cannot be received by the RSU and
so they will be counted in the calculation of uploading failure
rate. We vary the number of vehicles that have entered RSU’s
range during the simulation period from 25 to 200 in steps of
25. We repeat the experiment with MVEDR data uploading
intervals (UIs) 10 sec, 20 sec and 30 sec, respectively. For
each UI value, we further repeat the experiment with and
without security measures, including those encryption and
signature operations (we use SM to label experiments with
security measures). The result is shown in Figure 1. As
expected, as the number of vehicles increases, the uploading
failure rate increases. Also the smaller the value of UI , the
higher the uploading failure rate. With UI = 10 sec, there is
even a big increase in uploading failure rate when there are
more than 150 vehicles. This makes sense since more frequent
MVEDR data uploading induces more network trafﬁc and thus
network congestion. Nevertheless, the maximum packet failure
rate throughout our experiments is only around 20%. On the
other hand, we found that the security measures in our scheme
only yield a marginally higher dropping rate than the case
without security measures.
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Fig. 1. Dropping Rate vs. Number of Vehicles
In the second set of experiments, we study the transmission
delay. The transmission delay is deﬁned as the time period
from when a vehicle sends out the MVEDR data to when the
RSU receives the data properly. Longer transmission delay
means that there are more network trafﬁc congestion and
longer packet queuing delay. Again we vary the number
of vehicles that have entered the RSU’s range during the
simulation period from 25 to 200 in steps of 25. We repeat
the experiment with MVEDR data uploading intervals (UIs)
10 sec, 20 sec and 30 sec, respectively. For each UI value,
we further repeat the experiment with and without security
measures, including those encryption and signing operations
(we use SM to label experiments with security measures). The
results are shown in Figure 2. As expected, as the number of
vehicles increases, the average transmission delay increases.
Also the smaller the value of UI , the longer the transmission
delay. This makes sense since more frequent MVEDR data
uploading induces more network trafﬁc and thus network
congestion. Nevertheless, the maximum transmission delay
throughout our experiments is only around 0.35 sec. That
means RSUs should be able to receive MVEDR data in a
timely manner. Another similar ﬁnding as in the previous
experiment is that the security measures in our scheme only
yield a marginally longer transmission delay than without
security measures.
Fig. 2. Transmission Delay vs. Number of Vehicles
VII. FUTURE WORK
There are a number of issues in our proposed scheme
that need to be further investigated, such as how to set the
uploading interval. Other future work includes evaluation of
the scheme using real data and the design of a more efﬁcient
scheme to handle the data for shorter uploading interval.
Note that our system can be used in parallel with traditional
local MVEDR system such that MVEDR data are stored
both locally and on RSUs for enhancing the reliability of
accident investigation. We believe that this idea of distributed
MVEDR system can be applied to aircrafts using satellite
communications once the bandwidth of these communication
channels are large enough to make it feasible.
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